Bonhoeffer: Church and Community

"Since I as a Christian cannot live without the church, since I owe my life to the church and now belong to it, so my merits are no longer my own but belong to the church. Only because the church lives one life in Christ, as it were, can I as a Christian say that the chastity of others helps me when my desires tempt me, that the fasting of others benefits me, and that the prayers of my neighbours is offered in my stead" ~ Bonhoeffer, Sanctorum Communio, p. 183.

Balthasar on Christ and the Old Testament

"The form of Christ is inseparable from the Old Testament; together they constitute the one historical revelation in a diptych of type and antitype, promise and fulfilment. Within this unique system of order, Christ's form is indeed related to an overall order, but we cannot say therefore that Christ is subordinated to that order; for the point is precisely that promise and fulfilment are not neutral parts of a whole from which something univocal could be abstracted; promise as such has its truth in fulfilment. In so far as the promise, precisely, is not itself the fulfilled truth, it does indeed participate, but only participate, in the uniqueness of the fulfilment" ~ Hans Urs Von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics: Volume 1: Seeing the Form, p. 496.

(4) Pannenberg: History, Revelation, Resurrection

In his mature Systematic Theology, which commenced publication in German in 1988, Pannenberg may be seen to slightly reformulate the “from below” approach which he took in Jesus – God and Man. He states, “Rightly understood […] the two lines of argument from above and from below are complementary”.[1] There seems to be several reasons for this shifting accommodation to an argument “from above”. First, his Systematic Theology finally moves beyond the limited monographic genre of Jesus – God and Man towards a full-scale dogmatics. Pannenberg’s task, therefore, becomes one of relating Christology to the Doctrine of God proper, expressed in fully Trinitarian terms.[2] Second, Pannenberg is responding to various criticisms of his earlier work. Karl Barth, for example, wrote to his former pupil in the same year that Jesus – God and Man was published:

“My first reaction on reading your book was one of horror when on the very first page I found you […] intended to pursue a path from below to above”.[3]

Thus, we see Pannenberg much more willing to speak of the pre-existence of Christ and of fulfilling his eternal Sonship in the incarnation, even without immediate reference to the retroactivity of Jesus’ resurrection.[4] Further, whereas in the past Pannenberg merely asserted the historicity of the resurrection event, in his Systematic Theology he ventures to speak of the resurrection as a ‘metaphor’. We will discuss this further in the next post, but for now it will suffice to note that the concept of “metaphor” already contains a 'supra-historical' element within it. Despite the slight reformulation of the doctrine of the resurrection in his later Systematic Theology, Pannenberg never came to explicitly repudiate his earlier claims, and so we must believe them to stand, however nuanced, as the basic groundwork of his mature Christology.[5]

[1] Pannenberg, Systematic Theology: Volume 2, 289.
[2] Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematic Theology: Volume 2, 289. cf. Stanley J. Grenz, Reason for Hope: The Systematic Theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 134.
[3] Karl Barth, Karl Barth Letters1961 – 1968. ed. Jürgen Fangmeier and Hinrich Stoevesandt. Trans Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1981), 178.
[4] Cf. Pannenberg, Systematic Theology: Volume 2, 325.
[5] Whilst Pannenberg does not repeat the claims he made in Jesus – God and Man he frequently refers the reader to his earlier work. cf. Pannenberg, Systematic Theology: Volume 2, 277; 282 – 83; 289.

(3) Pannenberg: History, Revelation, Resurrection

I showed in my earlier post that Pannenberg believes to have dogmatically established the resurrection as the ground for Jesus’ unity with God. The necessary next step then, if he is to remain true to his Christology “from below”, is to somehow defend the resurrection as a historical event - an object of knowledge, not merely of faith. The resurrection must stand as the best historical explanation of the New Testament witness and the rise of Christianity.[1] Thus, Pannenberg argues that the resurrection of Jesus has, since the 19th century, fallen prey to an erroneous use of Ernst Troeltsch’s historical ‘principle of analogy’ (see Kim Fabricius' fantastic sermon on Troeltsch and the resurrection here.[2] That the probability of a past event is ruled out simply because there is no analogy to it in the present is to discount unique events off hand. Further, he argues that natural science cannot rule out the resurrection in principle since by nature it is incapable of making definitive judgments about the possibility or impossibility of individual events.[3] In positive terms, Pannenberg cites the Jerusalem empty tomb tradition, a fact that could not even be denied by Christianity’s Jewish opponents, as evidence for the resurrection.[4] Furthermore, the presence of women witnesses at the empty tomb also attest to the resurrection. This could not have been fabricated in a Markan “apologetic tendentious legend” since women were not considered to be reliable witnesses in the Jewish setting.[5] Finally, in his most recent historical defense of the resurrection, Pannenberg addresses Gerd Lüdemann’s claim that the New Testament “apparitions” of the Risen Jesus originated in the disciples’ psychological projections.[6] On the New Testament evidence alone, Pannenberg argues that Lüdemann’s thesis can only be believed under the antecedent presupposition that history precludes divine activity.[7] We must stress that for Pannenberg, this effort to ground the resurrection in history is not a mere apologetic addendum to the theological task proper. Rather, for a Christology “from below”, it is absolutely central to the very doctrine of the resurrection itself.[8]
[1] Ibid., 88 – 106.
[2] Wolfhart Pannenberg, “Redemptive Event as History,” in Basic Questions in Theology: Volume 1. trans. George H. Kehm (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1983), 39 – 80.
[3] Ibid., 98.
[4] Ibid., 99.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Wolfhart Pannenberg, “The Resurrection of Jesus: History and Theology,” Dialog 38 (1999): 21 – 23.
[7] Ibid., 23.
[8] Pannenberg believes that one of the central tasks of Christian doctrine is to “argue” the truth in public discourse and debate. cf. Pannenberg, Systematic Theology: Volume 1, 9.

The first post to this series can be found here

The second post can be found here

The Narrative Form of History?

"Few historians or philosophers would dispute the notion that writers of history make significant contributions in the ways mentioned above. What is hotly disputed, however, is the nature and extent of the historian's contribution. One of the major points of debate is whether narrative form as such is an aspect of reality itself or is a product of the historian's imagination. A narrative is characterised by having a plot, for example, with a beginning, middle and an end. Are such features aspects of reality itself or constructions created solely in the mind of the historian?" (V. Philips Long, The Art of Biblical History, p. 69)

Long's question is especially interesting alongside my current reading of T. F. Torrance. One point that Torrance continues to emphasise is that the contingent order of creation is congruous with and finds its grounding beyond itself in God's very own freedom and rationality. Now, if there really is a "narrative form" to creation, then what might the implications be for Torrance's doctrine of God? I am aware of the kinds of objections that are raised against so-called "narrative theologies" and their self-referentiality ("God is not a story") - nevertheless, I tend to think that narrative is an indispensible category for theology proper. And I tend to think that the category of drama is perhaps even more appropriate then narrative (so, Vanhoozer).
Now, if there really is a "narratability" to the created order, then how do we rightly see the creation so as to narrate it rightly?

Torrance on History and Incarnation

In Divine and Contingent Order, T. F. Torrance argues that the created order displays dependent independence, being dependent upon God for its continued sustenance, but possessing its own independent 'autonomy'. In Chapter 3, Torrance begins to explicate this notion of dependent independence in relation to Jesus' incarnation. Since his subject matter has up to this point been largely about space-time, Torrance has this to say about history:

"...it was the incarnation of God himself in Jesus Christ which constituted the dynamic centre from which the whole pattern and history of created reality is to be discerned, for all lines converge meaningfully at that point where they are transfixed, as it were, by a transcendent axis, much as the spokes of a cart-wheel are made to bear upon a centre through which is thrust the axle that gives the wheel its significance

Further on, speaking more broadly about the universe in general, Torrance says:

"...the natural axis of the universe is to be found not within the universe itself as an independent cosmological system, but in its relation to God its transcendent Creator. That is to say, from a theological perspective the physical universe is to be regarded as an open intelligible system which constitutes a consistent whole only in so far as it is completed beyond itself in God as its creative ground and ultimate end."

According to this model/metaphor, is Jesus part of the wheel, part of its transcendent axis, or part of both? And where on this wheel does the history of Jesus belong?

T. F. Torrance on the Dependent Independence of Creation

I'm continuing to read through T. F. Torrance's Divine & Contingent Order. In the second chapter he continues his discussion on the contingency and order of the creation, introducing the idea that the creation exhibits dependent independence. On the one hand its existence is wholly dependent upon God, and on the other hand it possesses its own independent 'autonomy'. Torrance says:

"Far from isolating the world from God, this contingent relation between them means that the world even in its creaturely otherness from God, is held continuously in such an ontological relation to God, the source of all rational order, that there is imparted to it a rationality of its own which is not incongruous with
God's rationality" (p.35)

A little further on he says:

"the reason for the creation is theologically traced back to the free, ungrudging will of God's love to create a reality other than himself which he correlates so closely with himself that it is made to reflect and shadow forth on its contingent level his own inner rationality and order" (p.35).

Now, in Torrance's own words, "the idea of dependent independence is not easy in any case" and so naturally all this raises a bunch of questions for me: What ontology/metaphysics is he working with here? What kind of ontological relation is this? Is he here thinking in terms of analogy, participation, or what? Just how "closely correlated" is the creation to God?

Who Will Come from East and West?

Jesus’ saying that many will come from "east and west" to recline at the table and eat in the kingdom of heaven appears to clearly speak of the inclusion of the Gentiles in God's kingdom.[1] Whilst this has been by far the majority view in the history of interpretation of this passage, Davies and Allison prefer to read this passage as indicating only the inclusion of Diaspora Jews in the kingdom. They offer a compelling list of reasons for this particular reading: First, the Gentiles are not explicitly named. Second, the phrase ‘east and west’ in Jewish literature is often associated with the return of Diaspora Jews to the land. Third, in the OT the inclusion of Gentiles in the kingdom is never conceived as a judgment on Israel. Fourth, if the ‘sons of the kingdom’ refers to Jews as a whole, then all Israel is implausibly consigned to perdition. Fifth, and finally, there are no OT passages that connect the feast of the kingdom of God with the coming of the nations, however there are multiple passages that do connect the feast with the return of Diaspora Jews.[2] Davies and Allison are right to bring each of these aspects to bear upon our understanding of the passage. However, despite the reasonableness of their argument, its force is dramatically diminished once we realise that nowhere in Jewish tradition was the salvation of Diaspora Jews in doubt, nor would their inclusion in the kingdom strike anyone as the grounds for ‘eschatological reversal’. As Meier points out, it seems odd that Jesus would offer a contrast of this kind between Diaspora Jews over and against Palestinian Jews. In his own words, “nowhere else in the authentic words of Jesus is there any indication that Jesus ever reflected upon the special situation of Diaspora Jews as distinct from Palestinian Jews.”[3] Finally, we cannot rule out of hand Jesus’ interpretation of the Jewish background in a direction not previously emphasised in Jewish literature, especially in light of a collection of passages that depict Gentiles entering into Zion upon Israel's restoration.
[1] cf. Lk.13:28-30//Mt. 8:11-12. Dunn places this amongst the authentic sayings of Jesus that speak of ‘eschatological reversal’. cf. Dunn, Jesus Remembered, 416- 417.
[2] For the full discussion cf. Davies and Allison, Matthew, 27 – 28.
[3] Meier, Marginal Jew vol.3, 315.

Realized Eschatology in Corinth?

1 Cor. 4:8 is often put forward as the decisive indication of an over-realized eschatology at Corinth. Barrett believed, “The Corinthians are behaving as if the age to come were already consummated, as if the saints had already taken over the kingdom”. The clear signal is said to be Paul’s use of “already” in conjunction with “without us” (Thiselton; Fee). Furthermore, “already” is taken by some as Paul’s catchword of over-realized eschatology, based on its usage in 2 Tim. 2:18 and Phil. 3:12 (Schrage; Munck).

This interpretation has faced serious opposition recently by some scholars who favour a sociological explanation for the Corinthian problems. Some scholars do not recognise an eschatological aspect of Paul’s statement. Pickett, for instance, sees no need to “spiritualize” 1 Cor. 4:8. He finds over-realized eschatology inadequate to explain the purely interpersonal dissensions in Chapter 1. The verse is to be understood as part of Paul’s ‘rhetoric of status’ directed towards an arrogant upper class group in Corinth whom Marshall labels ‘the Hybrists’[1]. Thus, sociological factors are seen to be at the forefront of 1 Cor. 4:8, in agreement with the fact that most cases of hybris in Greek literature occur in social or ethical contexts rather than religious ones.

Many rightly observe a Cynic-Stoic influence on the Corinthian’s thinking of themselves as “rich” and “reigning as kings” (Barrett; Thiselton; Paige; Hays). Hays, however, believes that the eschatological language in 1 Cor. 4:8 must be Paul’s way of describing the situation and not the Corinthian’s. (cf. Horsley; Barclay). Thus, a valid warning goes out not to mistakenly “mirror read” Paul’s language into the Corinthian’s situation (Garland). Hays says, “The eschatological framework is [Paul’s] way of getting critical leverage on the Corinthian boasting”.

Hays’ views may be questioned on a number of levels. First, even if we admit the Cynic-Stoic background there is no immediate reason which prevents us from combining it with an eschatological explanation (Barrett; Thiselton). Afterall, it is not difficult to imagine a theological problem manifesting itself in concrete sociological ways and vise versa. The Cynic-Stoic influence may well have made the Corinthians susceptible to an over-realized eschatology. Second, if Paul was casting the Corinthian problem in an eschatological framework, as Hays rightly acknowledges, then it seems reasonable to suggest that their problem really was eschatological. But Hays can only avoid this reading by suggesting that the Corinthians “lacked any definite eschatology” (Hays; Barclay; Garland).

This view is possible but speculative. We might presume, on the basis of Paul’s 18 month long stay in Corinth, that eschatology formed a major part of his preaching and of the Corinthians’ subsequent acceptance of the gospel. Furthermore, we would have to question the effectiveness and persuasiveness of Paul’s theological arguments in his letter if indeed the Corinthians’ did not operate within an eschatological worldview (Beker). It is of course possible that Paul’s eschatological message “failed to resonate” with the Corinthian Christians (Garland), however for the reasons listed above we cannot be so confident that this was the case. It is more likely that they operated within a definite eschatological framework which had been modified by secular philosophy.

On the basis of 1 Cor. 4:8 alone it seems reasonable to suggest that there could have been a combination of eschatological and sociological factors contributing to the Corinthians problem. But can this view be maintained with regard to the letter as whole?

[1] The Hybrists had an attitude of superiority and arrogance, intending to dishonour and shame others (Marshall 1987, 210-211). In using the rhetorical convention of ‘covert allusion’, Paul places himself in the position of a socially disadvantaged victim of the Hybrists in order to admonish them (Winter 1997, 196-201; 2001, 69; cf. Marshall 1987, 182-219; cf. Fitzgerald 1984, 120).

T. F. Torrance Amongst the Scientists

Reading through Torrance's Divine and Contingent Order last night I quickly realised why the book was "intended more for scientists than for theologians" (p. ix). In the first chapter, which deals with the contingency of God's creation, Torrance undertakes a fine discussion concerning Einsteinian and Newtonian physics, particles and fields, relativistic space-time, quantum theory, hidden variables,open and closed systems, biology and so on. To be sure, Torrance doesn't engage head on with the mathematical nitty-gritty behind all this, however the kinds of conclusions that he draws suggest a pretty good understanding. I wonder if anyone out there might be able to verify how well Torrance understood the stuff he writes about in this book?

Here's a sample from Chapter 1, p.15, in which Torrance is outlining the move away from 'determinism' in modern science. For Torrance, the following description of the contingent 'openness' of the created order derives from the self-sufficient freedom of God, and is yet grounded in it (p.21). :

"If I understand recent developments in quantum field theory and particle theory correctly, this is the direction in which thought has been moving, that is, into a situation in which particles are conceived as four-dimensional entities in space-time, as concentrations of energy interconnected in fields of force, where many 'particles' are not so much particles as nodules of exchanging connection between strongly interacting particles, and where the fields of force themselves are as significant as the particles they hold together in a profound configuration of dynamic relations. Here where the distinction between particles and interconnecting forces diminishes we move even further away from classical mechanics and its deterministic conception of causal order obtaining between separated bodies in motion which retain their substantial identity through all changes in space and time. Here we have a relational type of order which is at once dynamic and open, which appears to require for its expression a differential calculus of possibility and consistency rather than of probability, for the nature of the universe as it discloses itself to us constantly takes us by surprise."

Economics and Choice @ Capitalism Project

Mark Sampson has a great post titled Capitalism, Choice and Freedom over at Capitalism Project.

Stanley Hauerwas in Vancouver